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2951 CASE NOTES 295 
Real Property - CONDOMINIUMS - DEVELOPER SELF-DEALING -Point 
East Management Corp. v .  Point East One Condominium Corp., 
282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 258 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 
1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974). 
A group of individuals developed a Florida condominium complex 
composed of four separate condominium clusters, each with its own in- 
corporated' owners association. While the developers owned all of the 
condominium units and controlled the owners associations, they caused 
the associations to enter into 25-year management contracts with a man- 
agement corporation also controlled by the developers and a 99-year lease 
of adjacent land owned by the developers for use as a common recreational 
fa~i l i ty .~ When the purchasers of the individual units later assumed con- 
trol of the owners associations, they felt that the terms of the management 
contracts and the lease were onerous and sued for their rescission. The  
associations alleged that by engaging in self-dealing the developers had 
breached fiduciary duties owed to unit purchasers, and asked that the 
management contracts be declared void for containing provisions con- 
trary to the intent of the Florida Condominium Act.3 The  trial court 
agreed that the management contracts were clearly in violation of the 
intent of the Condominium Act because " [t] his delegation and abdica- 
tion of responsibility and control exceeds the bounds of statutory author- 
ity and defeats the purposes of the Condominium Act."4 The trial court 
declared the management contracts unlawful and void,5 but denied all 
other relief s ~ u g h t . ~  The District Court ofAppeals affirmed per curiam,' 
but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did 
llncorporation of the owners association is authorized by FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 7 1 1.12(1) (1 969), 
reproduced here at note 23 infra. 
2The separate lease of recreational property was authorized by FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 71 1.121 
(1 969), reproduced here at note 13 infra. 
3 F ~ ~ .  STAT. ANN. 9 711 (1969). The specific language relied upon by the associations in 
Point East appears in section 71 1.12(1) ("The operation of the condominium shall be by the 
association, the name of which shall be stated in the declaration.") and section 711.03(2) 
("Association means the entity responsible for the operation of a condominium."). 
4258 So. 2d 322,324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
5Zd. 
6The action in the trial court was actually a consolidation of three separate suits: 
In one action the associations sued the management corporation seeking cancella- 
tion of the management contracts because of alleged breaches of contract; damages for 
breach of contract; an accounting; and a determination that the management contracts 
were void because against public policy and for failure to conform to the requirements 
for such contracts as provided for in the Condominium Act [citation omitted] . 
In a second action the associations sued the four individual developers seeking damages 
for alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary duties. The third action was by the associations 
against the four individual defendants, for cancellation of the. .  . lease, of which said 
defendants were the lessors. 
Id .  at 323-34. 
' I d .  at 324. 
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not intend to restrict the power of the associations to contract for the 
management of condominium properties, and adding that management 
contracts should not be declared invalid solely because the developers 
had contracted with themselves.8 
In recent years, condominiumsg have proliferated as an alternative t~ 
the single family dwelling.'() A condominium purchaser buys not only 
his own unit,ll but also an undivided interest in common elements.l? 
The common elements are typically maintained by a unit owners associa- 
tion, and the costs of improving and maintaining them are generally 
shared by the unit owners through payment of a required monthly assess- 
ment. 
These common ownership arrangements, foreign to most purchasers 
of single family homes, have been used to disguise developer compensa- 
tion not reflected in the purchase price of the unit, but passed to the 
buyer through monthly assessments. For example, the developer will 
sometimes sell or lease recreational facilities to the association, rather 
than making them a part of the common elements included in the pur- 
8282 So. 2d 628,630 (Fla. 1973). 
9Condominiums are generally creatures of statutory law. State enabling acts were passed 
in response to section 234 of the National Housing Act, which authorized FHA insurance on 
individual condominium unit mortgages, where recognized by state law. National Housing 
Act 5 234, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962). See also, Legislation Note, Condominium- A Compara- 
tive Analysis of Condominium Statutes, 13 DE PAUL L. &v. 11 1 (1963). 
'OFigures released by the Department of Housing and Urban Development indicate that 
during 1973 construction was started on approximately 241,000 condominium units, repre- 
senting roughly 29 percent of all private starts of housing for sale in the United States. 
Nearly half of the unit starts reported by HUD were in the South, principally in Florida. 
Lines 6. Numbers, HUD CHALLENGE, January 1975, at 33. A 1972 HUD study revealed that in 
that year condominiums constituted 40.3 percent of new housing units completed for sale, and 
49 percent of all housing units under construction, in 25 selected metropolitan areas. NAHB 
JOURNAL-SCOPE, November 5, 1973, at 47. Although much of the early condominium growth 
was in the vacation or second home market, current inflationary trends are pricing the single 
family dwelling out of the reach of many would-be home owners. The condominium offers 
most of the incidents of home ownership, often at a significantly lower cost per square foot. 
See Introduction to 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE at Intro-1 
(1 974) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN & RESKIN] ; Berger, Condominium: Shelter On A Statutory 
Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 987 (1963); Seeber, Condominiums in North Carolina: Im- 
proving The Statutory Base, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 355, 356 (1971); Comment, Con- 
dominium: An Introduction T o  The Horizontal Property System, 11 DE PAUL L. REV. 319, 
321 (1962). 
"There is some disagreement as to whether the "unit" owned in fee simple by the purchaser 
consists of the floor, ceiling, and walls surrounding the unit or only the air space enclosed 
therein. 1 ROHAN & RESKIN 5 1.01 [2] . 
12Essentially, the "common elements" include everything in the condominium complex not 
owned in fee simple by the unit purchaser; areas for the use of all unit owners ("general corn- 
mon elements") and areas for the use of more than one but less than all unit owners ("limited 
common elements"). 1 ROHAN & RESKIN 5 6.01. 
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chase price of a unit.l3 Perhaps the most important opportunity for the 
developer to increase his undisclosed profits on a condominium project 
results from the fact that until there are a sufficient number of unit own- 
ers to assume control of the owners association and elect their own man- 
aging board,14 the developer controls the association.l5 During this 
interim period, the developer may engage in self-dealing by executing 
contracts on behalf of the owners association with developer-owned or 
affiliated companies on terms far less favorable to the prospective unit 
owners than would have resulted from arms-length transactions.l6 In  
this way, the developer can obtain an inflated price for recreational 
property,l? or assure himself of continuing profits of as much as 300 per- 
cent per year by leasing it at an excessive rentalY18 or he may hire his own 
IsFlorida's Condominium Act, for example, specifically provides that the owners associa- 
tion may obtain an interest in recreational property apart from that which is actually sub- 
mitted to condominium: 
In addition to any other provisions of this chapter, an association may acquire and enter 
into agreements whereby it acquires leaseholds, memberships and other possessory or use 
interests in lands or facilities including but not limited to country clubs, golf courses, 
marinas and other recreational facilities, whether or not contiguous to the lands of the 
condominium, intended to provide for the enjoyment, recreation or other use or benefit 
of the unit owners. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 71 1.121 (1969). 
l4The managing board is the governing body for the owners association, and assumes the 
basic responsibility for management and maintenance of the condominium. Where the 
condominium project is a large one, the board may delegate the day-to-day duties and decision- 
making authority to a professional management company. For a discussion in connection with 
the Point East case of the extent of the owners association's power to delegate management 
duties see Note, Long Term Management Contracts Between Condominium Associations and 
Developer-Controlled Management Corporations Held Not Violative of The Florida Con- 
dominium Act, 28 U .  MIAMI L. h v .  451,456 (1974). 
l5State condominium acts do not specify when the unit owners are entitled to assume control 
of the owners association. Rohan and Reskin suggest that the declaration or bylaws of a 
condominium commonly provide that the initial meeting is to be called by the developer any 
time after at least 51 percent of the units are occupied, but not later than the final occupancy 
of all the units. 1 ROHAN & RESKIN 5 17.02, at 17-3. Some developers take advantage of the 
general uncertainty and hang on as long as possible. A Florida commission investigating con- 
dominium problems in that state heard several such complaints. Note, Legal Protection For 
Florida Condominium and Cooperative Buyers and Owners, 27 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 451, 455 
(1973). 
'GSee, e.g., note 18 infra and accompanying text. 
''The developer may reap unconscionable, though undisclosed, profits by conspiring with 
a third party. For example, he may buy the property at a price far in excess of fair market 
value, and then sell it to the association at an apparently reasonable profit. He derives an 
unfair profit by receiving a secret rebate from the third-party seller. For discussion of this 
sort of "flip sale" in connection with the purchase of condominium or cooperative property 
see Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and The Federal Securities Laws, 71 COLUM. L. 
REV. 118, 120 (1971). 
'*The Attorney General of Florida has recently stated that developers investing as little as 
$2 million in recreational facilities typically reap unconscionable profits of between $3 mil- 
lion and $6 million annually, theoretically for as long as 99 years. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1974, at 
1, col. 4. 
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management company to maintain and manage the common areas.19 T o  
date, Florida cases are the only reported decisions on the issue of whether 
the unit owners, when they assume control of their owners association, 
can be bound by such agreements. 
The first condominium developer self-dealing case in Florida was 
Fountainuiew Association, Znc., No. 4 u. Be1L20 In that case, the develop- 
ers, while serving as the sole officers of the owners ass~ciat ion,~~ indi- 
vidually conveyed or leased land to the associations on allegedly inflated 
terms and entered into third-party management contracts at allegedly 
exorbitant fees.22 When the unit purchasers later assumed control of the 
associations, organized by the developers as nonprofit ~orporations,~3 
they caused the associations to bring a suit to recover the excessive profits 
and fees. The court interpreted the Florida Condominium Act24 to 
mean that such associations are to be governed by the law applicable to 
private corporations for profit and ruled against the associations, holding 
that a 1930 Florida case, Lake Mabel Deuelopment Corp. u. Bird,25 was 
dispositive.26 According to the Fountainuiew majority, Lake Mabel held 
that a sale of property to a corporation by its promoters, while they still 
held all of its outstanding stock, could not later be avoided by the corpora- 
tion, because the corporation had full knowledge of the facts at the time 
of the sale and the rights of prospective purchasers had not yet-arisen. 
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Fountainuiew decision per 
~u r i am.~7  
Since Fountainuiew, the Florida courts have consistently refused to 
invalidate the actions of self-dealing developers. In Wec hsler u. Gold- 
IgThe developer may hire a subsidiary to manage the condominium, or an affiliated man- 
agement company, or he may receive a kickback for awarding the management contract to a 
third-party management company. Note, Florida Condominiums - Developer Abuses and 
Securities Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U .  FLA. L. REV. 
350,353 (1973). 
20203 SO. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), a f f d  per curium, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968). 
21As in the Point East case, the project was organized as several separate condominiums, each 
with its own association. In Fountainview, only associations No. 4 and No. 5 were joined as 
plaintiffs. Id. 
221d. at 658. 
23The Florida Condominium Act provides that: 
The declaration may require the association to be organized as a particular entity, such 
as but not limited to a corporation for profit or corporation not for profit, in which the 
owners of units shall be stockholders or members. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 71 1.12(1) (1969) (emphasis added). 
241d.; 203 So. 2d at 659. 
2599 Fla. 253,126 So. 356 (1930). 
26203 SO. 2d at 659. 
27Fountainview Association, Inc., No. 4 v. Bell, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968). Before Fountain- 
view, authorities had suggested that the choice of a corporate form of owners association would 
have no legal consequences. H. Kane 8- W. Helms, The Illinois Condominium Property Act, 
2 U .  ILL. L.F. 157.175 (1970). 
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man28 the developers were the sole directors of a corporation which leased 
communal recreational facilities to an owners association which they also 
controlled. Although the annual rental was greater than the assessed 
value of the property, the court upheld the validity of the lease, citing 
Fountainview and adding that there had been adequate disclosure to the 
purchasers at closing,29 notwithstanding the fact that they had not been 
advised of the lease when they were initially solicited or at the time they 
signed preliminary contracts. The court acknowledged its reluctance to 
deny relief from the lease, and suggested that the facts in Wechsler and 
Fountainview indicated a need for legislative amendment of the Con- 
dominium Act to prevent future developer ab~ses .3~ Similarly, in Riviera 
Condominium Apartments, Inc., v .  Weinberger,3l the court denied re- 
lief to the plaintiff owners association, but reiterated the call for legisla- 
tive reform. 
The district court32 decision in Point East appeared to be a reversal 
of the previous Florida pattern of refusal to invalidate condominium de- 
veloper self-dealing. The court declared invalid contracts 
made or caused to be made by the original owners or developers of a 
condominium between the condominium association and a manager or 
management corporation, which [operate] to divest from the association 
in a material or substantial degree the power and privilege granted it by 
the statute to operate the condominium.33 
The court emphasized that the Fountainview and Riviera cases were dis- 
tinguishable from the Point East decision in that they turned on the 
validity of developer self-dealing per se, while Point East did not. In- 
stead, the Point Ea t  trial court examined the express language of the 
Condominium Act and concluded that an owners association, regardless 
of who controlled it, could legally enter into a management contract, but 
only to the extent that it was not thereby substantially or materially 
divested of control over the management of the condominium. The  
28214 SO. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). 
29At closing, all but one of the purchasers individually agreed in their closing contracts to 
be guarantors of the lease. Id. at 742. 
3OZd. at 744. 
3l231 SO. 2d 850 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). In Riviera, the developers, while acting as 
directors of the incorporated owners association as well as directors of the corporation provid- 
ing management and maintenance services, made an allegedly excessive payment of $7500 
for management services from the association to the management company only two weeks 
before turning over control to the unit owners. Noting that services had been rendered and 
that purchasers knew of the payment before they bought, the court upheld the payment 
citing Wechsler and Fountainview. 
32This was the same District Court of Appeals that had denied relief to the plantiff associa- 
tions in Fountainview, Wechsler, and Riviera. 
33258 SO. 2d at 325. 
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specific evil which the trial court seized upon in Point East was excessive 
delegation of the authority to manage, not self-dealing on the part of the 
developers.34 This interpretation of statutory language was limited to 
the management contract, however. The district court admitted that the 
lease contained provisions which might motivate a court of equity to 
grant relief, but citing Wec hsler, found it valid.35 
The Florida Supreme Court reexamined the language of the Con- 
dominium Act relied upon by the district court and concluded that the 
legislature, recognizing the magnitude of the maintenance and manage- 
ment tasks in a large condominium complex, had not intended to restrict 
the ability of condominium owners associations to contract for manage- 
ment services.36 Neither the degree of delegation nor the long duration 
of the Point East management contracts were found to make them objec- 
tionable. Further, the court concluded that the fact that the contract was 
entered into by the developers, dealing with themselves, rather than by 
associations controlled by the unit owners, did not invalidate it, citing 
Lake Mabe1.37 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Ervin argued that the Lake 
Mabel decision was irrelevant because the district court decision in Point 
East rested almost exclusively on the court's interpretation of the Con- 
dominium Act.38 
A.  Judicial Relief from Condominium Developer Self-dealing 
Although a few commentators have suggested that the Florida cases 
upholding condominium developer self-dealing are contrary to the trend 
34The court was probably attempting to reach the equities involved by using a theory more 
consistent with the rationale of the prior self-dealing cases, rather than directly overruling 
them. One commentator has recently suggested that the trial court result in Point East could 
be reached by applying corporate doctrines limiting the power of a corporation's board of 
directors to delegate their duty to manage the corporation. Note, Long Term Management 
Contracts Between Condominium Associations and Developer-Controlled Management Cor- 
porations Held Not Violative of the Florida Condominium Act, 28 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 451, 
456 (1974). Of course, this theory and the statutory interpretation approach used by the 
Point East trial court are both of limited value to owners associations in that they are only 
applicable to management contracts, leaving onerous leases and other self-dealing contracts 
untouched. 
35258 SO. 2d at 326. 
36Point East Management Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 
(Fla. 1973). 
371d. at 630. 
38Id. (dissenting opinion). The Point East plaintiff associations subsequently brought 
suit in Federal Court based upon an antitrust tie-in theory. 
The defendants, on the eve of a jury trial in which they were facing treble damages as to 
fees received under the Management Agreements terminated the Agreements in full 
settlement of all claims and thereby released the four Plaintiff Associations from any 
liability under the remaining 17 years of the Agreements. 
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in the majority of jurisdi~tions,3~ there have been no condominium de- 
veloper self-dealing cases reported outside Florida. This lack of case law 
is partly due to the fact that other states are only now beginning to ex- 
perience the rapid growth in condominium development which has 
characterized the Miami area for a number of years. Many other states, 
however, permit incorporation of the owners association, either expressly 
in the condominium act or impliedly by making no reference to the form 
of organization to be used. There is some danger that those states will 
choose to follow the Florida cases or may be influenced to reach the same 
result by applying their own comparable principles of corporation law. 
Although there are no cases outside Florida on the problem of condo- 
minium developer self-dealing, there were several New York cases in the 
1950s involving self-dealing on the part of sponsors of cooperative hous- 
ing projects.40 The New York courts held that sponsors owed a measure 
of fiduciary duty to purchasers, and the original Fountainview plaintiffs 
sought to draw support fi-om those  decision^.^' The Fountainview court 
ignored the New York cases, however, reasoning that Fountainview was 
not a case of first impression in Florida and relying instead on Lake 
MabeLQ The New York courts had concluded that a self-dealing co- 
operative sponsor could be held to strict fiduciary standards only for self- 
dealing transactions which occurred after sales to the public had b e g ~ n . ~ 3  
As to self-dealing occurring prior to any such sales, the sponsor was held 
only to a duty to disclose the resulting contracts to the unit buyers." 
Letter from Gerald F. Richman, counsel for plaintiff associations, to James E. Gleason, Jr., 
October 23, 1974, on file in the Brigham Young University Law Review. 
39Note, Florida Condominiums - Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create 
a Need For a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 350, 355 (1973); Note, Real Prop- 
erty - Georgia's Apartment Ownership Act - Its Scope Analyzed in View of Emerging 
Litigation in Other Jurisdictions, 23 MERCER L. REV. 405, 41 1 (1972); COOPERATIVES AND CON- 
DOMINIUMS 17 (J. McCord ed. 1968); see also Justice Ervin's dissent from the Florida Supreme 
Court's opinion in Point East, 282 So. 2d at  634. 
40The leading case was Northridge Co-op. Section No. 1, Inc. v. 32nd Ave. Constr. Corp., 
207 Misc. 164, 136 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1955), modified, 286 App. Div. 422, 142 N.Y.S.2d 
534 (1955), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 514, 161 NY.S.2d 404, 141 N.E.2d 802 (1957). For other cases 
and discussion see Note, Federal Assistance In Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apart- 
ments, 68 YALE L.J. 542, 586 & n.281 (1959). For discussion comparing condominiums to co- 
operative apartments see 1 ROHAN AND RESKIN § 1.01 [2] ; 1 A. FERRER AND K. STECHER, LAW OF 
CONDOMINIUM $ 10 (1967); Comment, Practical Guide to Condominium Law in Connecticut, 
4 CONN. L. REV. 669,673-76 (1972); Comment, FHA Condominium: A Basic Comparison Wi th  
the FHA Cooperative, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014 (1963). 
4lFountainview Ass'n, Inc., No. 4 v. Bell, 203 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), 
a f f d  per curium, 214 SO. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968). 
421d.; see note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
43See note 40 supra and accompanying text. 
44At least one cooperative case interpreted the sponsor's duty of disclosure to extend not 
only to the terms of contracts entered into, but specifically to the dual position occupied by 
the sponsor-director. Clearview Gardens First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Corp. v. Weisman, 
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 1957, p. 1 1, col. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957). 
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Accordingly, a New York sponsor could easily enter into binding con- 
tracts with himself, covering sales or leases of land, maintenance, man- 
agement, or even con~truct ion,~~ prior to making the first sale. Thus, the 
cooperative sponsor's duty was not actually fiduciary in nature but was 
effectively limited to disclosure in a manner somewhat analogous to the 
application of corporation law principles relied on by the Florida courts 
in the condominium cases. The fact that the New York courts, when con- 
fronted with equities similar to those involved in the Florida condo- 
minium cases, also denied relief to purchasers underscores the possibility 
that courts in other jurisdictions will determine that relief from condo- 
minium developer self-dealing is unavailable under existing corporate 
and condominium law. 
The Florida cases, and the New York decisions before them, rest in 
part on the finding in each instance that the allegedly onerous contracts 
had been "disclosed" to the prospective purchasers prior to sale, implying 
that those who bought knew what they were getting into and should not 
later be heard to complain. However, the adequacy of the disclosure 
commonly provided in the homebuilding industry is open to q~est ion.~6 
The "notice" received by the average purchaser from the voluminous 
and highly technical contracts of sale4? and supporting documentation is 
often only a legal fiction. Even if the prospective purchaser reads the 
documentation, he frequently lacks the expertise necessary to assess the 
reasonableness of the reported costs and estimates of future costs,48 and 
is often unwilling to pay for expert advice. Further, a tight housing 
market may pressure him into overlooking unfavorable terms that he 
might otherwise question.49 Finally, the selection of a personal residence 
is not purely an objective investment decision, but involves elements of 
emotion, personal taste, etc. 
The above factors call into question the application of older corpora- 
tion law cases, such as Lake Mabel, in the context of condominium de- 
- 
450ne reason the doctrine established by the New York courts was thought viable was that 
under FHA rules, the actual construction of a cooperative could not begin until its stock was 
90 percent subscribed. Unfortunately, that rule did not preclude entering into binding con- 
struction contracts in advance. Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Co- 
operative Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542,586-87 (1959). 
46Zd. at 587; Wash. Post, July 6, 1974, at Dl,  col. 1. 
47The sales contract itself may run more than 100 pages. Wash. Post, July 6, 1974, at Dl,  
col. 1. 
48Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE 
L.J. 542, 587 and n.290 (1959); Comment, Condominiums in Virginia - The Condominium 
Act of l!V4,9 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 135, at 146 & n.107 (1974). 
49The New York courts have refused to be influenced by the problems associated with a 
tight housing market. In some of the cooperative cases, the courts recognized the existence of 
a housing shortage, but refused to give it special weight in assessing the developer's fiduciary 
duty. Nostrand Gardens, Inc. v. Roche, N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1958, p. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957); 
Northridge Co-op. Section No. 1, Inc. v. 32nd Ave. Constr. Corp., 286 App. Div. 422, 434, 142 
N.Y.S.2d 534,546 (1955) (dissenting opinion). 
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veloper self-dealing.50 Since 1930, when Lake Mabel was decided, both 
the federal government and the states have recognized a need to impose 
more stringent disclosure standards on corporate promoters, and have 
enacted federal securities acts and state "blue sky" laws. The Florida 
courts, by reaching back to Lake Ma be1 for corporation law precedent,51 
have seized upon a disclosure standard which has long since been recog- 
nized as inadequate in the corporation law context and is even less appro- 
priate in the condominium field. Until stringent statutory disclosure 
standards are imposed in the condominium field, the courts should avoid 
Florida's inappropriate application of out-dated corporation law and 
exercise their equity powers to grant relief where disclosure has actually 
been inadequate. 
B. Legislative Action To Curb Developer Self-Dealing 
If the Florida and New York cases are any indication of the approach 
that courts in other jurisdictions are likely to take in future self-dealing 
cases, the responsibility for providing adequate protection for condo- 
minium buyers will ultimately fall on the legislatures. The threshold 
policy issue is the extent to which condominium purchasers should be 
protected, not only from self-dealing developers, but from themselves. 
The available policy alternatives range from parens patriae to caveat 
emptor. 
1.  Supervision by a state administrative agency. Just as many "blue 
sky" laws regulating the offering and sale of securities provide that an 
offering must pass a state "merit'' review, a state legislature could em- 
power an administrative agency to police condominium offerings. Such 
an approach has a predecessor in FHA regulation of cooperative housing 
projects in the 1 9 5 0 ~ . ~ ~  
Because most of the postwar cooperatives were FHA insured,53 the 
FHA used its approval power over applications for mortgage insurance to 
implement rules designed to curb developers' self-dealing abuses.54 
For example, whenever an "identity of interest" existed between the co- 
operative corporation and the general contractor, a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
construction contract was required.55 Additionally, any such builder- 
Sosee, e.g., Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908); 
Lake lMabel Dev. Corp. v. Bird, 99 Fla. 253, 126 So. 2d 356 (1930). 
51See text accompanying note 25 supra. 
52Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE 
L.J. 542,588-92 (1959). 
53National Housing Act 5 213, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962). 
54Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE 
L. J. 542,588-89 (1 959). 
551d. at 588 & n.296. Of course, the restraining power of the regulation was dependent 
upon how broadly "identity of interest" was construed. 
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sponsor was required to employ an independent attorney who represented 
the future purchasers during contract negotiations and to appoint an in- 
dependent board of directors to serve until the purchasers could elect 
their 0wn.56 
The FHA has similar power to regulate condominium developers 
under the section 234 condominium mortgage insurance program.57 
However, because relatively few condominium developers currently seek 
FHA approva1758 FHA regulation is largely ineffective. 
A similar administrative approach could be adapted for use at the 
state level, however, and one writer has suggested legislative creation of 
a state condominium agency as a solution to Florida's condominium 
problems.59 Several states already require condominium developers to 
submit their declarations and other documentation to an existing state 
commission to assure that they meet the requirements of the state's con- 
dominium act prior to any public offering.60 The commissions are fre- 
quently empowered to inspect projects prior to approval.61 Once the 
developer has secured approval, no changes may be made in the ap- 
proved documents without the consent of the state commission. The 
authority of such commissions could be expanded beyond assuring 
accurate disclosure to policing the reasonableness of the offering. Where 
volume demanded it, the function could be shifted to a separate condo- 
minium agency. Such an administrative approach at the state level 
would afford wide-ranging protection to condominium purchasers with- 
out requiring them to seek redress in the courts. 
2.  Total revision of the state condominium statute. Active policing 
of condominium offerings by a state agency naturally requires consider- 
able continuing state involvement. In states where condominium abuses 
- - 
56The "independence" of any developer-appointed attorney seems highly questionable. Id. 
at 588. 
57National Housing Act 5 234, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962). The FHA has developed model 
condominium organizational documents which it requires developers to follow "with only 
such changes as may be required to conform to the facts pertaining to the individual project or 
to requirements of local law" (FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, CONDOMINIUM HOUSING IN- 
SURANCE AND SERVICING HANDBOOK, FHA MANUAL, Vo1. VI, Book 2, Part B, Appendix V-4 
5 4.2). See, e.g., 1 ROHAN & RESKIN 5 9.04 [7] for an explanation of FHA Form No. 3281, the 
model management agreement. 
58HUD figures indicate that in 1973, of 241,000 condominium units started, only 9,785 units 
were HUDIFHA insured. Lines 6. Numbers, HUD CHALLENGE, January 1975, at 33. See also 
Vishney, Financing the Condominium, 1970 U .  ILL. L.F. 181, 182-83 (1970). Ironically, the 
availability of FHA insurance on individual condominium units precipitated the enactment of 
the state condominium acts. Note 9 supra. 
59Note, Florida Condominiums - Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications Create 
a Need For a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. h v .  350,365 (1973). 
Gosee, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS 5 514-15 (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $5 559.23-.27 (1967); 
VA. CODE ANN. $5 55-79.16 to -79.21 (1974); WASH. h v .  CODE ANN. 5 64.32.100 (1965) (in Wash- 
ington, the documents are submitted to the county auditor). 
61See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS 5 514-31 (1968). 
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are not extensive, a less expensive alternative would be a thorough review 
and overhaul, if necessary, of the state's condominium act. When FHA 
mortgage insurance was authorized for individual loans on condominium 
units in 1962, the states scrambled to respond with condominium en- 
abling legi~lat ion.~~ Typically, these early condominium statutes were 
poorly drafted and are inadequate to cope with developer abuses, includ- 
ing self-dealing, which were not foreseen when the statutes were enacted. 
While Virginia and Florida have created special commissions to thor- 
oughly examine their condominium acts, most states have not adequately 
updated their statutes.63 As the inadequacies of these acts become in- 
creasingly apparent, states should modify their statutes accordingly. 
3. Statutory imposit ion o f  developer fiduciary duties. Although 
the Florida courts refused to recognize the plaintiff associations' claim 
that the developers owed a fiduciary duty to purchasers, one specific 
remedy for developer self-dealing would be to identify those duties in the 
condominium act itself. So far, such provisions in the condominium acts 
have been limited to prohibiting misrepresentation in promotional 
materials or official documentation.64 Given the inadequate disclosure 
standards in the condominium field, unscrupulous promoters need not 
resort to outright misrepresentation to reap exorbitant profits from self- 
dealing. Statutorily imposed fiduciary standards should be broader and 
directed at self-dealing transactions occurring at any t i m e  during the 
development of a condominium project. 
After identifying the developer's fiduciary obligations, the statute 
should broaden remedies available to aggrieved purchasers and associa- 
tions for violation of those duties. Presently, the only remedy available 
under the misrepresentation statutes is rescission of the contract of sale.65 
Yet in most instances, the condominium buyer has purchased his unit 
because he wants to live in it. Especially where he has moved his family 
and possessions in, his interest may not be best served by rescission. A 
more appropriate remedy might be invalidation of onerous management 
contracts, leases, and other agreements arising out of developer self-deal- 
ing, and an accounting for and recovery of excessive amounts already 
paid by purchasers. 
4. Statutory restrictions o n  management  contracts. Another ap- 
proach to upgrading condominium statutes would be to place statutory 
restrictions on management contracts. For example, in 1973, the Vir- 
62National Housing Act 5 234, 12 U.S.C. 5 1715y (1962). 
Wee, e.g., notes 64,66,67 & 69 infra and accompanying text. 
64See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS 5 514-45 (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 559.28 (1967); VA. 
CODE ANN. 5 55-79.28 (1974). 
65See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS 5 514-47 (1972). Developers found guilty of misrepresenta- 
tion are also subject to criminal penalties: HAWAII REV. LAWS 5 514-46 (1968); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. 5 559.28 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. $55-79.28 (1962). 
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ginia legislature amended the state's condominium act to limit developer- 
created management contracts to five years.66 Such a provision does 
nothing, however, to limit onerous covenants in the contracts, such as 
authority to make major expenditures for repairs from association funds 
without association approval. Florida has provided a broader remedy 
by making any original management or maintenance contract subject to 
cancellation upon a 75 percent vote of the association members67 any 
time after the unit owners assume control of the ass~ciation.~g In Cali- 
fornia, where condominiums are regulated for some purposes by the 
Real Estate Commission, a 51 percent vote of the unit owners will suf- 
fice." Even these remedies, however, reach only management contracts. 
Similar remedies should be extended to leases or sales of recreational 
facilities, and other contractual arrangements arising out of developer 
self-dealing. 
5 .  Imposition of more stringent disclosure standards. Finally, those 
legislatures that prefer to stay closer to the caveat emptor philosophy 
should at least develop or strengthen disclosure standards in the con- 
dominium field. Disclosure should be simple and brief enough that the 
average purchaser, without benefit of counsel, will not be discouraged 
from reading it, yet clear and complete enough that he will be warned of 
potential pitfalls. For example, adequate disclosure is increasingly being 
compelled by statutes and administrative decisions which treat condo- 
minium offerings involving rental pool arrangements or other profit in- 
centives as investment contracts or securities, and require registration 
and disclosure under the securities laws.70 Another example is the state 
requirement of a separate short-form statement, containing prescribed 
W A .  CODE ANN. 5 55-79.21:2 (1974). 
6 7 F ~ ~ .  STAT. ANN. 5 711.13(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974-75), repealed, Ch. 74-104, 8 8 [I9741 1 
Laws of Fla. 2d Reg. Sess. 163, 172, reenacted in substance as 711.66(5), Ch. 74-104,s 16 [1974] 
1 Laws of Fla. 2d Reg. Sess. 163, 190. Justice Ervin, in his dissent in the Point East case, 
points out that the existence of this 75 percent rule at the time the Point East case arose did not 
render the plaintiff associations remediless in that litigation because the management con- 
tracts involved there were entered into prior to the effective date of that legislation (282 So. 
2d 628, at  633). 
68There is some dispute over when the unit purchasers are entitled to take over. If as Rohan 
and Reskin suggest, 1 ROHAN & &SKIN § 17.02, at  17-3, it is any time after 51 percent of the 
units are owner occupied, the Florida 75 percent rule (note 67 supra) could be invoked by as 
little as 39 percent of the eventual total membership of the association. 
Walifornia's 51 percent rule is an administrative regulation promulgated by the Real Estate 
Commissioner. 10 CALIF. ADMIN. CODE 2792.8(18)(a) at 4023 (1971). 
7OFor fuller discussion of the characteristics that have caused some condominium offerings 
to be construed as securities see 1A ROHAN AND RESKIN $ 18; Clurman, Condominiums A s  
Securities: A Current Look, 19 N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974); R. Dickey & B. Thorpe, Federal Securities 
Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's ~e'rspective, 62 GEO. L.J. 1403 (1974); Ellsworth, 
Condominiums Are Securities?, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 694 (1974); Comment, Securities: Another 
Way to Regulate the Resort Development Boom, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 104 (1974); Comment, 
Securities Regulation of Condominium offerings, 51 CHI-KENT L. REV. 148 (1974). 
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information and warnings.71 If the burden is to be left on the buyer to 
protect himself against developer fraud, more stringent disclosure stan- 
dards can at least provide him with more accurate and complete informa- 
tion on which to base his judgment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
That self-dealing abuse by condominium developers has become a 
serious problem is evidenced by recent action at both the state and federal 
levels.T2 In the absence of federal regulatory action, the burden remains 
on the states to protect the unsuspecting condominium buyer, not only 
from misrepresentation, but from readily disguised self-dealing abuses 
as well. The Point East and other Florida cases, and the New York co- 
operative decisions before them, suggest that the courts may fail to pro- 
vide such protection. The state legislatures should therefore determine 
7lFlorida1s newly revamped Condominium Act, in addition to setting forth in considerable 
detail the items of information which must be included in the developer's prospectus or offer- 
ing circular, requires that the purchaser be provided a statement entitled "Important Matters 
T o  Be Considered In Acquiring A Condominion Unit," containing prescribed bold-faced 
warnings about recreational leases, management contracts, and several other potential haz- 
ards, where applicable to the particular offering. The new Florida act also requires that any 
contract for the sale or lease of a condominium unit by a developer must contain a caveat in 
bold-faced type to the effect that oral representations by the developer cannot be relied upon 
and that the buyer should refer to the contract and required documents. Ch. 74-104, [I9741 1 
Laws of Fla. 2d Reg. Sess. 163, 193. The changes suggested by the Florida condominium com- 
mission are discussed in Comment, Legal Protection For Florida Condominium and Coopera- 
tive Buyers and Owners, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 451 (1973). 
Virginia has also revised its condominium act in an effort to afford the purchaser a full and 
fair disclosure comparable to that required under the federal securities regulation acts. VA. 
CODE ANN. 55 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The Virginia act requires an elaborate 
public offering statement, to be delivered to the purchaser either 10 days before the signing 
of the contract, or on the contract date provided the purchaser is given 10 days in which to 
cancel. The Virginia Real Estate Commission is given broad powers of enforcement under 
the Act's disclosure requirenents, including imposition of criminal penalties of up to 6 months 
imprisonment and/or $50,000 in fines for each offense. The amended Virginia Condominium 
Act is discussed in Comment, Condominiums in Virginia - The Condominium Act of 1974, 
9 U .  RICHMOND L. REV. 135 (1974). 
In Hawaii, the Real Estate Commission not only inspects the brochures, declarations, by- 
laws, and other documents associated with each condominium offering, but prepares its own 
report to be distributed to each potential purchaser, containing clear warnings about any 
self-dealing transactions the developer has entered into as well as comparisons of the project's 
costs and cost estimates with averages for comparable projects. The developer may not enter 
into a binding sales contract until the prospective purchaser has read and executed a receipt 
for the real estate commissioner's final public report. HAWAII REV. LAWS 5 514-41 (1968). If 
subsequent circumstances occur which would render the final public report misleading to 
purchasers, the developer must stop all sales until a supplementary public report describing 
all changes has been issued. HAWAII REV. LAWS 5 514-42 (1968). 
72The state of Florida has filed a test case against one of its biggest condominium developers, 
charging that an onerous recreatiohal facilities lease amounts to an illegal restraint on trade 
in violation of a Florida statute patterned after the Federal Trade Commission Act. N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 4. The FTC has itself undertaken a wide-ranging investigation 
of the condominium industry, stemming from a preliminary investigation of Florida abuses. 
Wash. Post, July 6, 1974, at Dl, col. 1. 
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as a matter of policy the extent to which they will protect condominium 
purchasers and then implement that policy through revisions of their 
condominium acts. 
Trademarks AECTION 44(d) OF THE LANHAM ACT - USE IN COM- 
MERCE BY THE FOREIGN APPLICANT AS A PREREQUISITE O SECURING A 
UNITED STATES TRADEMARK REGISTRATION -John Lecroy 6 Son, Znc. 
v .  Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F .  Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132 (D.D.C. 1974). 
During the past 25 years, patent tribunals have alternated between two 
conflicting positions as to the requirements for foreign applicants seeking 
United States trademark registrations. John Lecroy & Son, Inc. a. 
Langis Foods Ltd.' was hailed as an opportunity for a judicial tribunal to 
confront this administrative confusion squarely and settle the matter. 
Instead, the court chose to cast aside the alternatives offered by previous 
administrative decisions and to forge a third position. Thus, the con- 
clusion of the court, rather than dousing the fires of confusion, has only 
served to fuel them. 
Langis Foods Limited (Langis), a Canadian corporation, filed applica- 
tion in Canada on March 28, 1969, to register the trademark "Lemon 
Tree."2 At this time Langis had not used this mark in either Canada or 
the United States.3 By September 19, 1969, the date it filed application 
for registration of Lemon Tree in the United States, Langis had begun 
using the mark in Canada. As Langis had still not used the mark in the 
United States, it stated a claim of priority under section 44(d) of the 
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)4 which would have given Langis 
an effective application date of March 28, 1969, the filing date of its 
Canadian application. 
During the interval between Langis' Canadian and United States 
filing dates, John Lecroy & Son, Inc. (Lecroy), a United States corpora- 
tion, commenced using the trademark Lemon Tree in the United States, 
'John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F. Supp. 962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 192,64 TRADE- 
MARK REP. 301 (D.D.C. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom. SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., NO. 
74-1841, D. C. Cir., August 26, 1974. 
2The trademark "Lemon Tree" is for use in conjuction with dry crystals which when mixed 
with water create lemonade. Id .  at 964, 182 U.S.P.Q. at 133,64 TRADE-MARK EP. at 302. 
sunlike the law in the United States, Canadian law permits an applicant to file for registra- 
tion of a "proposed trademark before the mark has actually been used. However, registra- 
tion is granted only if use of the trademark is commenced within 6 months of the date of the 
intial filing. In fact, of the more than 70 nations subscribing to the International Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, [1962] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, no more than 
three require use prior to the filing of an application. John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods 
Ltd., 177 U.S.P.Q. 717, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 308 (T.T.A.B. 1973), vacated, 376 F. Supp. 
962, 182 U.S.P.Q. 132,64 TRADE-MARK EP. 301 (D.D.C. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom.  SCM 
Corp. v. Langis Foods Ltd., No. 74-1841, D.C. Cir., August 26, 1974. 
4Lanham Act 5 44(d), 15 U.S.C. 5 1126(d) (1970). 
